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Abstract—Argumentation has been proved as a simple yet
powerful approach to manage conflicts in reasoning with the
purpose to find subsets of “surviving” arguments. Our intent is
to exploit such form of resolution to support the administration of
security in complex systems, e.g., in case threat countermeasures
are in conflict with non-functional requirements. The proposed
formalisation is able to find the required security controls and
explicitly provide arguments supporting this selection. Therefore,
an explanation automatically comes as part of the suggested
solution, facilitating human comprehension.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONS
An Abstract Argumentation Framework (AAF), or System,
as introduced in a seminal paper by Dung [1], is simply a
pair 〈A,R〉 consisting of a set A whose elements are called
arguments and of a binary relation R on A, called “attack”
relations. Roughly speaking, an argument is anything that
may attack or be attacked by another argument. The sets of
arguments (or extensions) to be considered are then defined
under different semantics, which are related to varying degrees
of scepticism or credulousness. Suppose two arguments a and
b are mutually in conflict, i.e., a attacks b, and b attacks a,
then either {a} or {b} can be presented as possible acceptable
extensions. Argumentation is an important subject of research
in Artificial Intelligence and it is also of interest in several
disciplines, such as Logic, Philosophy and Communication
Theory (see [2, Ch. 1]).
Argumentation allows us to link different arguments on a
topic, highlight counterarguments and reason about a balance
of the opinions, thus reasoning in presence of conflict. In other
words, this kind of reasoning under uncertainty ({a} or {b}?)
can be used in security areas where different opinions should
be taken into account before a decision is made. Abstract Argu-
mentation finds subsets of “collectively acceptable” arguments
about the security of a system, and then show why a specific
decision was taken and counterarguments rejected/accepted.
In this work we focus on application of Abstract Argu-
mentation for decision-making during risk management of a
system. We assume, that the owner of the system has already
identified the main threats and would like to check whether the
security countermeasures installed in the system are sufficient
to maintain the risk level at minimum. Such analysis may be
used separately, or as a part of the overall risk assessment
process (see, for example [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]).
The main goal of any risk assessment is to assure that
security goals are achieved (e.g., protect critical assets). More-
over, security should not also violate the core business goals
for operation of the system. For example, productivity of
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the system should not be impacted by security measures
significantly. Moreover, some security countermeasures may
conflict with each other, reducing the overall security level.
We see argumentation logic as a formal way to structure the
control analysis and selection process and help the analysts to
weight arguments supporting installation of new controls.
In this work we provide two version of the approach. The
first one is a high level representation of the risks, security
controls, goals and relations between them. Such a model is
easier to build but it lacks of specific details and its quality
and usefulness heavily depends on the analysis. The second
version is based on the network topology of the organisation
and explicitly indicates the weaknesses in the security system.
The mains contribution of this paper is an approach for
analysis of security system with abstract argumentation frame-
work. In particular, the approach: i) describes how to build
abstract argumentation framework out of general description of
the system or using network topology, ii) visualises the existing
arguments supporting and attacking each other, iii) supports
decision making by analysis of the framework and checking
whether considered countermeasures are able to protect the
system properly and satisfy the business goals.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sec. II we introduce
the necessary background notions related to AAFs. In Sec. III
we introduce our case example. Sec. IV and V propose a high
level and topology-aware versions of our approach. Finally,
Sec. VI compares the paper with other similar approaches and
Sec. VII wraps up the paper and proposes some future work.
II. ABSTRACT ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORKS
In this section we briefly summarise the background in-
formation related to classical Abstract Argumentation Frame-
works (AAFs) [1].
Definition 2.1 (AAF): An Abstract Argumentation Frame-
work (AAF) is a pair F = 〈A,R〉 of a set A of arguments
and a binary relation R ⊆ A × A, called the attack relation.
∀a, b ∈ A, aR b (or, a  b) means that a attacks b. An
AAF may be represented by a directed graph whose nodes
are arguments and edges represent the attack relation. A set of
arguments S ⊆ A attacks an argument a, i.e., S  a, if a is
attacked by an argument of S, i.e., ∃b ∈ S.b a.
Definition 2.2 (Defence): Given F = 〈A,R〉, an argument
a ∈ A is defended (in F ) by a set S ⊆ A if for each b ∈ A,
such that b a, also S  b holds.
The “acceptability” of an argument can be defined under
different semantics σ, depending on the frequency of its mem-
bership to some sets, called extensions: such semantics char-
acterise a collective “acceptability” for arguments. In Def. 2.3
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Fig. 1. An example of AAF.
we only report the original semantics given by Dung [1] (suc-
cessive proposals can be found in the literature [2, Ch. 2.5]:
σ = {adm, com, prf , stb, gde}, which stand for admissible,
complete, preferred, stable, and grounded semantics.
Definition 2.3 (Semantics [1]): Let F = 〈A,R〉 be an
AAF. A set S ⊆ A is conflict-free (in F), denoted S ∈ cf (F ),
iff there are no a, b ∈ S, such that a  b or b  a ∈ R.
For S ∈ cf (F ), it holds that i) S ∈ adm(F ), if each a ∈ S
is defended by S; ii) S ∈ com(F ), if S ∈ adm(F ) and for
each a ∈ A defended by S, a ∈ S holds; iii) S ∈ prf (F ), if
S ∈ adm(F ) and there is no T ∈ adm(F ) with S ⊂ T ; iv)
S ∈ stb(F ), if for each a ∈ A\S, S  a; v) S = gde(F ) if
S ∈ com(F ) and there is no T ∈ com(F ) with T ⊂ S.
We also recall that the different requirements in Def. 2.3
define an inclusion hierarchy on the extensions: from the
most to the least stringent we have stb(F ) ⊆ prf (F ) ⊆
com(F ) ⊆ adm(F ). For such reason, this hierarchy also
defines a degree of credulousness (conversely, “strength”) for
a considered subset of arguments, e.g., the stable semantics is
the least credulous (strongest) among all, and this is why it
will be extensively used in the rest of the paper. The grounded
extension is the minimal fixed point (on complete extensions)
of a framework: it minimises the arguments that are taken in.
Moreover, we can also define a strength level for each ar-
gument. A sceptically accepted argument proves to be stronger
than a credulously accepted one.
Definition 2.4 (Arguments acceptance-state): Given one
of the semantics σ in Def. 2.3 and a framework F , an
argument a is i) sceptically accepted in iff ∀S ∈ σ(F ), a ∈ S,
ii) a is credulously accepted if ∃S ∈ σ(F ), a ∈ S and a is
not sceptically accepted.
Example 2.1: Consider F = 〈A,R〉 in Fig. 1, with
A = {a, b, c, d, e} and R = {a  b, c  b,
c  d, d  c, d  e, e  e}. In F we have
adm(F ) = {∅, {a}, {c}, {d}, {a, c}, {a, d}}, com(F ) =
{{a}, {a, c}, {a, d}}, prf (F ) = {{a, d}, {a, c}}, stb(F ) =
{{a, d}}, and gde(F ) = {a}. Hence, argument a is sceptically
accepted in com(F ), prf (F ) and stb(F ), while it is only
credulously accepted in adm(F ).
In Def. 2.5 we introduce Preference-based Argumentation,
which will be usedE.g. in Sec. IV-A to refine extensions.
Definition 2.5 (Preference-based Argumentation [8]):
A preference-based argumentation framework is a triplet
〈A,R,Pref 〉 where Pref is a partial pre-ordering (reflexive
and transitive binary relation) on A × A. The notion of
defence (see Def. 2.2) changes accordingly: let a and b be
two arguments, we define b a iff R(b, a) and not a > b.
In order to find extensions, in the following of the paper we
exploit ConArg1 [9], [10], [11] (ARGumentation with CON-
straints), which is a reasoning-tool based on Argumentation.
1http://www.dmi.unipg.it/conarg/
III. SETTING THE SCENE
Consider a small research and development company
(SME). This company cooperates with other (often large) en-
terprises for the development of complex goods. Such company
possesses high-tech knowledge which has to be protected from
competitors. The cooperation with other enterprises is achieved
through the Internet. Finally, the company needs to use its
resources efficiently with the purpose to survive in a highly
competitive market. In short, the company has the following
security goals:
X protect the knowledge from external attackers (PKE);
X protect the knowledge from internal abuse (PKI);
X protect the communication channels (PC);
X efficiently use the available resources (Cost);
X ensure productivity of the operations (QoS).
The administrator of the SME has identified the following
threats (items) and related protective security controls:
z hacker penetration (HP):
∇ host IDS (HI),
∇ network IDS (NI),
∇ penetration testing (PT),
∇ proxy firewall (PF);
z employee abuse (EA):
∇ monitoring functionality (MF),
∇ audit procedures (AP);
z compromise of communication channel (CCC):
∇ VPN (virtual private network) (VPN),
∇ encrypted line (EL);
The questions for the administrator are: Is the current
protection enough? What can improve the security system? We
provide the answers to these questions using our approach.
IV. MODELLING WITHOUT TOPOLOGY
In this section we describe how to build an AAF. In this
initial application, our aim is to reason on the goals, threats,
and security controls (similar to the ones given in Sec. III).
We start with an empty framework F = 〈A,R〉, where
A = ∅ and R = ∅. First we add the main goals of the evaluated
organisation to the graph: let Ag be a set of arguments stating
that the goals are fulfilled. Then, we add possible threats
At (considered as arguments as well), and arguments for
possible security controls, i.e., Asc. Then, we add the attacks
R describing threats endangering the successful fulfilment of
goals Rt−g : At × Ag . The next step is to add attacks stating
that specific security controls are effective against specific
threats: Rsc−t : Asc×At. We should not forget about possible
conflicts between security controls Rsc−sc : Asc × Asc, and
security controls and the goals Rsc−g : Asc ×Ag . Finally, we
find the stable extensions of F and check that they do not
contain arguments for threats At∩stb(F ) = ∅ (i.e., threats are
eliminated) while main goals do belong to the set At ⊂ stb(F ).
Finally, the resulting abstract argumentation graph for
analysis of the considered system is: F = 〈A,R〉, where
A = Ag ∪At∪Asc and R = Rt−g ∪Rsc−t∪Rsc−sc∪Rsc−g .
Example 4.1: By considering the scenario in Sec. III, first
we collect
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Fig. 2. HI = Host IDS, NI = Network IDS, PF = Proxy firewall, PT =
Penetration test, CCC = Compromise of communication channel, VPN =
Virtual private network, MF = Monitoring functionality, EL = Encrypted line,
EA = Employee Abuse, HP = Hacker penetration, AP = Audit procedures,
PC = protect communication channel, PKI = protect knowledge from internal
abuse, PKE = protect knowledge from external abuse QoS = Good QoS, Cost
= efficient use of resources.
Ag = {PKE ,PKI ,PC ,QoS ,Cost},
At = {HP ,EA,CCC},
Asc = {HI ,NI ,HO ,VS ,PT ,PF ,MF ,AP ,VPN ,EL,
LL,SCA,FA,SSA,SSP}.
Their union consists in our set of arguments A. Then we
can focus on attacks: Rsc−t can be simply derived from the list
of items in Sec. III. We add an attack between each security
control and the corresponding threat they mitigate: for instance
HI  HP , MF  EA.
For what concerns Rt−g , hacker penetration may result in
a confidentiality violation of protected data (HP  PKE ),
employee abuse may lead to leakage of data (EA  PKI ),
while a compromised channel may reveal the data in trans-
mission (CCC  PC ). Note that some of these controls
may conflict with each other, leading to Rsc−sc attacks. For
example, the power of monitoring procedure and a network-
based IDS may be reduced with the use of encrypted line or
VPN (VPN  MF and EL  MF and VPN  NI and
EL NI ). Moreover, security controls often affect some of
the qualities of the system in a negative way: for instance,
monitoring functionalities can affect the responsiveness of
software (MF  QoS ), and penetration testing may be
considered too costly (PT  Cost).
The overall AAF is represented in Fig. 2. From such
framework, by using ConArg (see Sec. II) we obtain one
stable extension only, which is also the single preferred
one, and grounded (which is always unique, see Sec. II):
{AP ,VPN ,EL,HI ,PF ,QoS ,PKI ,PKE ,PT ,PC}.
Hence, we obtain that, as desirable, all the threats (HP ,
EA,CCC ) are prevented by countermeasures: they never
appear in all the considered semantics. However, we
realise that some security-controls may be dropped as well:
monitoring functionality and network-based IDS go in conflict
with the use of a VPN (MF and NI do not appear in the
solution). Finally, not all the goals have been achieved, since
having a penetration test impacts on the cost: argument Cost
does not belong to the solution, even if is not in conflict with
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Fig. 3. Stable extension {AP ,VPN ,EL,HI ,PF ,QoS ,PKI ,PKE ,
PT ,PC}.
any other security control.
Therefore, by gathering the information concerning our
network in the form of arguments, we can use Argumentation
semantics to visualise where noteworthy issues are. The Se-
curity Administrator can be suggested to find an alternative to
PT with the purpose to improve the use of available resources,
so to bring argument Cost back in. Not having Cost is due to
having PT as always (sceptically) accepted. For this reason,
the Security Administrator can be suggested to add a NotPT
argument (i.e., not having a penetration test countermeasure in
the network) that attacks PT , and viceversa: these two attacks
are clearly mutually excludable. By extracting again all stable
extensions we now find two equally strong solutions
• {AP ,VPN ,EL,HI ,PF ,QoS ,PKI ,PKE ,PT,PC},
• {AP ,VPN ,EL,HI ,PF ,QoS ,PKI ,PKE ,NotPT,
Cost,PC},
which are respectively depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. The
two extensions differ on arguments in bold, which are also
graphically grouped in both Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Consequently,
sceptically accepted arguments are AP , VPN , EL, HI , PF ,
PC , QoS , PKI , PKE , while credulously accepted arguments
are PT , NotPT , and Cost .
The minimal core of strong arguments is represented by
the (single) grounded extension (see Sec. 2.1), which is AP ,
VPN , EL, HI , PF , QoS , PKI , PKE , and PC .
A. A Refinement of Extensions
Since all the extensions satisfying a given semantics
are equally strong, all the returned results (i.e., Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4) are valid “truth versions”. For this reason, we can use
Preference-based Argumentation (see Def. 2.5) to restrain the
number of solutions. In order to accomplish this, we establish
a preference relation between arguments as it follows: we
• prefer a goal over a security control. e.g., Cost > PT ;
• prefer a goal over a threat, e.g., Cost > HP ;
• prefer a security control over a threat, e.g., Cost > HP ;
• prefer not having a security control, than having that
security control, i.e., NotPT > PT . It is clearly better
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Fig. 4. Stable extension {AP ,VPN ,EL,HI ,PF ,QoS ,PKI ,PKE ,
NotPT ,Cost ,PC}.
not to introduce a security control whenever possible, in
order to reduce the administration task.
By also coding such preferences we obtain only the solu-
tion in Fig. 4, thus including all the arguments representing
a goal. The Security Administrator is then unequivocally
supported in taking a final decision that does not include
penetration-test tools (as Fig. 3 would have suggested instead).
V. MODELLING WITH NETWORK TOPOLOGY
The approach proposed in Sec. IV is simple to apply, but
has some important limitations. First of all, relations between
threats and goals are established only with the knowledge
of an expert. In general, we are not able to say whether
hacker penetration reaches the secrete information. Instead,
an attacker is able to compromise computers which do not
contain this data. Moreover, if we would like to separate
different effects of hacker penetration (e.g., attack on one
server or on another one), we can do this only due to the
expert knowledge (an expert should mark threats and goals
for different services differently). Different controls may be in
conflict only when applied to the same element of the system.
What is more important, is that the high level model does
not guarantee that the applied control is effective against the
considered threat (without a proper control of the expert, of
course). For example, a host-based IDS may be installed on
a wrong server and leave an important machine unprotected.
Finally, many penetrations in the system require several steps
to prevent such penetrations, there is no need to prevent all
these steps (which may be costly), but to break the chain of
steps at some point. Firewalls and Network-based IDS often
work with this principle in mind. Naturally, an expert may
predict the effect of such controls, but we would like to reduce
the subjectivity of the analysis.
In order to improve our approach, we propose to consider
the topology of a system, and specify attacks/goals/counter-
measures for specific components of this topology.
For the sake of presentation, we focus on a simplified
network topology-model. We consider three types of elements:
devices, channels and networks. Channels in this work are
virtual connections of computers that have to be considered
Fig. 5. Example of network topology.
separately, and which usually work over usual networks. For
example, a channel between two partners over the Internet.
Let E be a set of elements e with a predicate
type : e 7→ TY PE defined over it. TY PE is a set
{d(evice), n(etwork), c(hannel)}. We formalise topology as
a graph TG = 〈E,AR〉, where the elements of the considered
topology are nodes and the arcs indicate direct connection
between the elements, i.e., between a device and a network, a
network and a channel, a network and a network, and a channel
and a device.
Example 5.1: The enterprise has one server (SV ) and three
workstations (WS , WS2 , WS3 ). Only workstation WS has
access to the sensitive information from server SV . Also the
partners P have access to the WS through the Internet. The
network of the enterprise consists of local access network
(LAN ), between WS , WS2 , and SV , and a Wi-Fi network
(WiFi ), between WS and WS3 . Finally, WS and WS2 have
access to the Internet directly (not via LAN). There are
also two channels which require special consideration: CH1,
between WS and SV and CH2, between WS and P .
All named elements are nodes in the graph
TG = 〈E,AR〉, where E = {WS,W2,W3, SV,
LAN,WiFi, CH1, CH2, INT, P} and relations can be
derived from the description above. Special considerations
required only for networks. WiFi is connected to the Internet,
when LAN is not. Therefore, there is an arc in the first case,
and there is no arc in the second2. See Fig. 5 for the network
topology and Fig. 6 for the corresponding TG.
In order to connect different elements of the topology as
arguments/attacks of an AAF, we consider three steps: i) enter
to an element trough a network/channel, ii) pass through the
element, iii) exit from an element to a network/channel.
Every step is considered as two arguments: protective
(positive) argument and risky (negative) argument, while the
first is attacking the second one. Now, if we need to indicate
the propagation from a network to an element we should:
• add two (positive and negative) arguments for the net-
work;
• add two arguments for a connection between the network
and the element;
2Someone may consider such topology not optimal, but we use it to show
different cases for application of our methodology
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Fig. 6. Example of network topology model.
• connect the negative argument from the first couple to the
positive one from the second couple;
• add two arguments for the element;
• connect the negative argument from the second couple
and the positive argument from the third one.
See Fig. 7. As a result we get a chain of six arguments
starting with a positive argument and ending with a negative
one. Note, that such a trick may help us to join different ele-
ments of the same network, and even elements of connecting
networks. For example, we may indicate how the same network
may affect its elements (see Fig. 8), or how one element affects
another one through the network.
Fig. 7. From network to an element: protective arguments are represented by
grey circles, negative arguments by black ones.
Fig. 8. From a network to elements: protective arguments are represented by
grey circles, negative arguments by black ones.
Chains of arguments separate the effect of a threat and its
cause. Every threat now should be marked with two arguments:
1) what is the result of the threat and 2) what is the initial
element of the topology where the adversary starts an attack.
For example, HP (INT, SV ) shows that a hacker penetration
initiates in the internet and targets SV. Naturally, the result of
an attack is the last argument of the chain (which then affects a
business goal). This node is always protected by construction.
In other words, our considered network is vulnerable but we do
not consider this threat unless there is someone to exploit it. In
order to add the threat to our model, we need to show where
this threat comes from, i.e., at which part of the chain the
attacker starts its malicious activity. In most cases, hacker may
be considered attacking the protecting argument of the Internet
(modelling the unsafe Internet case). Through the chain, the
attacker is able to reach her goal.
For simplicity, we denote protection argument for an ele-
ment e as P q(e), while Cq(e) states for compromising argu-
ment for the same element. Transition elements are P q(e1−e2)
and P q(e1−e2). We would like to note, that there are different
types of threats, and different types of protection respectively.
For example, availability of a node may be considered as
a different argument with respect to its integrity. Naturally,
hacker penetration target integrity of a node, when vandals
launch a DoS attack and affect availability of the element.
In order to take this different nature of threats into account,
we mark protecting and compromising arguments with type
q ∈ Q, where Q is a set of all types of penetration.
Let e1 and e2 be two elements of a network. Then we
propose a notation e1
q−→ e2 to express a graph F ′ =
〈A′, R′〉 formed with the six arguments, similar to Fig. 7,
such that: A′ = {P q(e1), Cq(e1), P q(e1 − e2), Cq(e1 −
e2), P
q(e2), C
q(e2)}, R′ = {P q(e1)  Cq(e1), Cq(e1) 
P q(e1 − e2), P q(e1 − e2)  Cq(e1 − e2), Cq(e1 − e2) 
P q(e2), P
q(e2)  Cq(e2)}. We also use a similar no-
tation to show that an element may attack an argument
ARG : e1
a1−→ ARG (ARG ∈ A) to express a graph
F ′′ = 〈A′′, R′′〉 formed with the three arguments, such
that: A′′ = {P q(e1), Cq(e1), ARG}, R′′ = {P q(e1) 
Cq(e1), C
q(e1) ARG}. Finally, we write e1 q−→ e2 ⇒ F to
indicate, that we add all arguments and transitions to F .
Let TG = 〈E,AR〉 be a topology graph. Let TF =
〈N,ED〉 be an abstract argumentation graph constructed from
TG in the following way: for every edge 〈e, e′〉 ∈ AR, add
e
q¯−→ e′ ⇒ TF and e′ q¯−→ e⇒ TF , where q¯ is the type of the
attack to be instantiated later.
There is no need to indicate how security controls affect the
external threats. Similar to threats, security controls also should
be marked with the element to which the control is applied.
For example, HI(LAN) shows that the network-based IDS is
installed for network LAN. The security controls are simply
result in arguments attacking insecure states of the system
(negative arguments). For example, a firewall does not stop
a hacker from trying her penetration attempt, but protects the
connection between the Internet and the internal network from
such attempts. Similarly, a host-based IDS does not stop a
hacker from penetrating to the network, but protects a specific
node from being compromised as a result of this attempt.
A. Methodology for analysis with topology
Our methodology for the security analysis with topology
starts with TG = 〈E,AR〉 and corresponding TF = 〈N,ED〉
and can be seen as follows:
1) The first step is to add all security goals to as arguments
Ag to F the graph Ag ⇒ F .
2) Then, we add the topology to the AAF: copy TF to F .
3) We add the arguments for the threats to the model linking
arguments for goals with argument for elements.
a) Substitute all q¯ in F with q = “int′′, i.e., seizing
control threats
b) For every threat at(e, e′) of type q.
i) First, for all elements e′ ∈ E, which compromised
by a threat type q impact goal ag ∈ Ag , we add
eq
q−→ ag ⇒ F . eq is e′ if q is of type “int′′, and
is a twin for e′ required for the analysis of threats
of type q only.
ii) Second, for all elements e′′ ∈ E, which are con-
nected to e′, we add e′′
q−→ eq ⇒ F .
iii) Third, we add the threat at ∈ At itself and its
connection to the topology element e: at
q−→ e⇒ F .
4) Add arguments Asc for security controls to F graph and
connect them to the graph according to the predefined
description of the controls. Every control should specify
which node it may protect and how it is connected to
the topology. Similar to threats, security controls may
define to which element of the system (or connection),
they are applied, as well as the type of threat they
protect from. For example, a network-based IDS can be
seen as NI(NW, int), where NW is the name of the
network element and q = “int′′ is a type of threat which
results in attacker getting the possibility to send and
receive messages from a network or a node. A monitoring
functionality, can be defined as MF (WS−INT, abuse),
indicating that the monitoring is performed for communi-
cation going from WS to the Internet, preventing possible
employee abuse.
We propose to add also two more arguments between the
security control argument and the attacked argument (see
top four arguments in Fig. 9 for an example). The reason
for doing that is that adding a control to the system could
be impeded by some parts of the system. Thus, although
the control is present in the system it cannot provide its
functionality properly. The considered case of conflicts
of security controls is an example of such situation (e.g.,
VPN applied to the same channel as a Network-based
IDS impedes work of the latest, see Fig. 9).
Note, that every security control should be added accord-
ing to its functionality and depending on the topology.
For example, a Network-based IDS protects the network,
when, in fact, it protects all elements of this network
(including other sub-networks).
5) Add attacks of security controls on security goals Rsc−g
and on other security controls Rsc−sc.
6) Now we are able to analyse AAF and find all stable
extensions. In this work we analyse separately every set
of threats heaving the same origin of attack, i.e., the same
attacker. Thus, at step 3b we add to same F only threats
with the same initial element e. Now, for every built F
we look whether the stable extension includes all business
goals. Moreover, we may conduct a what-if analysis to
optimise the network configuration.
Fig. 9. Example of a security control conflict.
Note, that steps 4 and 5 require special consideration,
depending on the type of the threat and security controls
considered. These are rules which have to be specified by
experts for every threat and can be simply applied in every
specific analysis.
B. An Example with Topology
The first step of our methodology is similar to the previous
example and Ag = {PKE ,PKI ,PC ,QoS ,Cost}. On the
other hand, we should specify threats with more details:
• hacker penetration (to SV): HP (INT, SV );
• employee abuse of the user of WS (through networks
Internet, WiFi): EA(WS, INT ), EA(WS,WiFi);
• compromise of communication channel (CH1 and CH2 ):
CCC(INT,CH1), CCC(INT,CH1).
Note, that every threat consists of the name, source and
target of the threat (e.g., HP (INT, SV ) shows that hacker
penetration originates from the Internet and targets the server).
Now, it is clear, that for Step 3b(i) of our methodology it is
required to add SV “int
′′
−−−→ PKE to F , where q = “int′′
refers to getting control over SV . Step 3b(ii) for q = “int′′
does not change the graph. In order to realise step 3b(iii) we
should add HP “int
′′
−−−→ INT to F . Naturally, here the hacker
does not get full control over the whole Internet, but is able to
send and modify messages through it. Similarly, other threats
are specified to attack security goals. Note, that these parts are
disjoint now. This means, that the goals are defended.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that HP and CCC are
both of type “int′′ and we simply re-use the graph built from
the topology (TF ) updated with the threat related arguments,
as it is stated in steps 3b(i) and 3b(iii). The result is shown in
Fig. 10.
Employee abuse does not require seizing power of el-
ements, thus next to adding attacks for compromising the
security goal (step 3b(i)) PKI INT a “abuse
′′
−−−−−→ PKI and
WiFia
“abuse′′−−−−−→ PKI and the threat itself (step 3b(iii))
EA
“abuse′′−−−−−→WS, we also need to add attacks indicating the
fact of abuse (step 3b(ii)) WS “abuse
′′
−−−−−→ INT a, WS “abuse
′′
−−−−−→
WiFia and also P “abuse
′′
−−−−−→ INT a, WS2 “abuse
′′
−−−−−→ INT a,
CH1
“abuse′′−−−−−→ INT a, P “abuse
′′
−−−−−→ WiFia, WS2 “abuse
′′
−−−−−→
WiFia, CH1 “abuse
′′
−−−−−→ WiFia. Although, we assumed that
only WS can abuse the data, the graph already shows that
instead of sending secrete data directly to the untrusted chan-
nels, a dishonest employee may find a different path for
the data leakage. Assume that this employee knows about
possible monitoring his/her interactions through the INT or
WiFi. He/she may compromise a computer of a colleague (e.g.,
WS2 ) and redirect the secrete data through it to an untrusted
channel. Finally, we would like to note that arguments for
INT a and INT (WiFia and WiFi) are not the same:
although they are related to the same element of the network,
but INT (WiFi) can be used for further attacks, when INT a
(WiFia) attack only the one goal PKI .
Now we are able to add the security controls installed in
the system. These controls may be defined as follows:
P 
INT 
PC 
CH2 
CH1 
HP 
CCC WS3 WiFi 
WS 
LAN 
WS2 
SV 
PKE 
Fig. 10. Example of AFF for analysis of HP and CCC threats.
• Network-based IDS: NI(LAN, int)
• Host-based IDS: HI(SV, int)
• Proxy Firewall: PF (INT,WiF i, int)
• Penetration testing: PF (LAN, int)
• Monitoring functionality: MF (WS,LAN, abuse),
MF (WS,CH1, abuse), MF (WS,CH2, abuse),
MF (WS, Int, abuse), MF (WS,WiFi, abuse)
• VPN: V PN(WS,CH1, int), V PN(P,CH1, int),
V PN(NW,CH1, int), V PN(WS,CH2, int),
V PN(SV,CH2, int), V PN(LAN,CH2, int),
• Encrypted line: EL(WS,CH1, int), EL(P,CH1, int),
EL(NW,CH1, int), EL(WS,CH2, int),
EL(SV,CH2, int), EL(LAN,CH2, int),
Every security control applied not only to the specified
elements of the system, but also some others, regarding to
the rules specified for the control. For example, Network-
based IDS protects not only the primary network, but also
all networks and channels based on the primary network.
Similarly, the penetration testing protects not only the network,
but also all elements of this network from being seized by a
hacker.
Finally, we should specify all negative effects of security
countermeasures. These negative effects also rooted in the
parameters of the security control. For example, monitoring
functionality reduces productivity of WS node only, leaving
other elements of the network unaffected. The negative effect
of a VPN can be seen when we consider the channel encrypted:
CH1, which is also protected by a network-based IDS (CH1
is affected since it is a part of LAN primarily affected by NI).
The similar negative effect VPN has on MF functionality.
For the sake of simplicity we consider only HP and CCC
cases. The stable extension related to this example includes
two goals that are consequently protected (PC and PKE ),
while Cost is not in because it is in conflict with PT , as in
Fig. 4. By introducing NotPT , as in Fig. 3, we can make Cost
appear again in a second stable extension. However, we also
note that PF is not included in the stable extension: we can
deduce that having such counter measure is not useful for this
kind of attack, given the topology of this network.
In addition, we can see what happens if we remove
two security controls from the configuration, i.e., HI
and PT . We obtain the following stable extension
{C INT ,C INT WS2 ,C WS2 INT ,C INT WS ,C WS INT ,
P LAN WS2 ,C WS2 LAN ,P LAN WS ,C WS LAN ,P LAN CH2 ,
P CH2 LAN ,P CH2 WS ,P SV CH2 ,P CH2 SV ,P SV LAN ,
P LAN SV ,C WS2,C WS,P SV ,P CH2 ,PC ,PKE ,HP,CCC ,NI ,
P NI LAN ,VPN ,P VPN WS CH2 ,P VPN LAN CH2 ,Cost,
P VPN SV CH2}. We now notice that Cost is in (since no
more in conflict with PT ), thus all three goals are satisfied.
Moreover, we see that this happens even if two machines
WSand WS2 (in bold) are compromised. Therefore, the
remaining security controls are still enough to satisfy all the
goals, because the critical point is the server SV . Finally, note
that although we have network-based IDS installed together
with conflicting VPN, we still get all goals satisfied, since the
conflict relates to CH2 only, where VPN provides adequate
protection, leaving NI protect the LAN.
VI. RELATED WORK
Since the application of Argumentation to Cybersecurity-
related issues is relatively a new field (or, at least, not deeply
investigated), there is a few related work to be mentioned.
A bunch of works applying Argumentation-based conflict-
resolution to the specific case of firewall rules are [12],
[13], [14]. In our approach, however, we provide a general
reasoning-tool, not focused on firewall rules only, but applica-
ble to network security in general.
In [15] the authors formalise the reasoning about access
control using a planning theory formalised in Dung’s abstract
argumentation framework [1]; such planning is based on an
adaptation of Dung’s notion of defence. Their formal argumen-
tation framework allows arguments about the backward deriva-
tion of plans from objectives and policy rules (abduction), as
well as arguments about the forward derivation of goals from
general objectives. Parties negotiate to find an agreement about
which policy to apply, even though there may be more than
one way to achieve a security objective.
A first general and introductory work on Argumentation
and Cybersecurity is proposed in [16]. There the authors
suggest the use of Argumentation to provide automated sup-
port for Cybersecurity decisions. Three different tasks where
Argumentation can contribute are surveyed in the paper: first,
the establishment of a security policy, drawing from a range
of information on best practice and taking into account likely
attacks and the vulnerability of the system to those attacks.
Secondly, the process diagnosis to determine if an attack is
underway after some apparent anomaly in system operation is
detected; the final goal is to decide what action, if any, should
be taken to ensure system integrity. At last, Argumentation
can be used to reconfigure a security policy in the aftermath
of a successful attack: this reconfiguration needs to ensure
protection against future similar-attacks, without creating new
vulnerabilities.
The work in [17] introduces an approach for the en-
forcement of security requirements based on argumentative
logic; the aim is to reason about activation or deactivation
of different security mechanisms under certain functional and
non-functional requirements. The framework is applied to an
automotive on-board system. Differently from this work, in
[17] the authors take advantage of Argument-based Logic
Programming (see [2, Ch. 8]), and not Abstract Argumentation
(see Sec. II).
In [18], some of the authors of this paper propose how
arguments can support the decision making process: the aim
is to help the system security administrator to react (or not) to
possible ongoing attacks. For instance, a decision can be taken
either to disable traffic through port 80 or not to disable it. The
work in [18] represents a first step along the line presented
here; however, it does not consider the topology of a network.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown how abstract argumentation framework
may be helpful in analysis of security of a system. There
are different ways how an analyst may use the proposed
framework. The most straightforward way is to analyse the
existing system. Then, the analyst may start conducting what-if
analysis, considering different alternatives (e.g., as it is shown
in Example 4.1, when option of having and not having pen-
etration testing is considered). We have shown, that although
well-defined high level model can be good representation of
reality and used for analysis, the topology-aware version of the
approach is less dependent on the correct specification by an
analyst and provide much more details, allowing wider range
of analysis types.
There are a number of ways to improve the work and make
the analysis more powerful. First, we did not exploited the full
range of analysis techniques provided by the argumentation
logic. We would like to explore deeper these techniques in
order to widen the possible analysis. One possible direction is
to help an analyst to select the minimal set of countermeasures
which still satisfy business goals. We can also consider the
requirements for compliance with a standard (e.g., 2700x [19]).
Our approach clearly depends on the input of analysts: e.g.,
goals, threats, possible countermeasures, and attacks need to be
provided. However, note that some tools already automatically
suggest fixes for known vulnerabilities.3 On the other hand, the
approach is structured in a way to automatise many of the most
boring steps. For example, if a formalised network description
is available the dependency between nodes can be specified by
a tool. Moreover, this tool may include the database of threats,
goals, possible countermeasures, and dependencies between
them. For example, new countermeasures may be added to the
model automatically, if properly formalised. Implementation
of such tool is also our future goal.
In this work, we considered cost and productivity require-
ments in a simplistic way. In the future, we would like to
consider these and other constraints in a quantitative way,
e.g., consider cost of every security control separately and
aggregating the cost of all controls at the end, keeping it
below some threshold. Also the preferences of arguments can
be seen in quantitative or qualitative way in order to compare
the effects of arguments on the system and prioritize stable
extensions. This approach should help the analysis to select
the most appropriate configuration.
3For instance, Nessus: http://tinyurl.com/q6buj5d.
Another possible future direction of our work is taking into
account dynamicity of the system. The proposed method so far
is static but it can be improved for a fast re-analysis when a
part of the system or strategic business goals change.
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